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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the relation between firm geographic location, i.e., urban vs. rural, and managers’ 
earnings management choices. Adopting multiple definitions of urban and rural firms, we consistently 
find that compared to rural firms, urban firms are less likely to use production-related real earnings 
management while more likely to use accrual earnings. In addition, we find that firms’ urban location 
reduces the positive impact of both firm complexity and Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) on managers’ decisions 
of using real earnings management. Overall, this study suggests that urban firm managers reduce the use 
of value-destroying real earnings management because (1) investors possess greater familiarity towards 
urban firms, and (2) more investors are readily accessible to urban firms’ soft information. In additional 
tests, we focus on a subsample of earnings management suspect firms and find that managers’ tradeoff 
decision of these two earnings management strategies is conditional on firms’ geographic locations. 
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Geographic Location and Accounting Choices: Evidence from  
Managers’ Earnings Management Decisions 
I. Introduction 
Prior literature finds that managers influence financial performance measures through either 
alternating firm’s operational activities or using accruals to manipulate earnings (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2008; Zang 2012). Recent studies posit that firms’ geographic locations have a 
significant impact on the cost of obtaining information and the effectiveness of external monitoring, 
which affect the firms’ liquidity, information dissemination, and corporate payout policies (Loughran and 
Schultz 2005; Loughran 2007; John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva 2011). We extend this line of research by 
investigating the relation between firms’ geographic locations and managers’ earnings management 
decisions. We provide evidence that firms’ locations exert an economically significant impact on 
managers’ earnings management decisions, incremental to the determinants addressed in the existing 
studies. 
In general, managers can manage earnings through operational (real earnings management or 
REM) and accrual accounting decisions (accrual earnings management or AEM). Although both are 
costly, REM and AEM are fundamentally different and have distinct impacts on firm performance. REM 
is managers’ purposeful operational practice to alter reported earnings in a particular direction by 
deviating firms’ operational activities from their optimal levels (Roychowdhury 2006). Prior studies show 
that REM is value-destroying and has a suboptimal consequence on future firm performance (Bhojraj, 
Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis 2009; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). In addition, REM leads to higher tax costs 
in the current period as it affects firms’ current and future cash flows (Zang 2012).  As such, institutional 
investors and outside stakeholders pay close attention to firms’ REM activities (Roychowdhury 2006; 
Zang 2012). Examples of REM include overproduction, which leads to lower cost of goods sold (COGS) 
and/or the reduction of selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A), advertising expenses, and 
research and development expenses (R&D), which leads to higher gross margin.  
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In contrast, AEM changes the reporting methods or estimates used for a given transaction in the 
financial reporting while keeping operational practice unchanged. Examples of AEM include changing 
the estimate of provision for bad debt expense and the depreciation method for fixed assets. Although 
managers have the flexibility to make judgments and estimates under accrual accounting, they must 
follow the guidelines enforced by the regulators and auditors. In addition, due to the reversing nature of 
accrual accounting, managers’ biased judgments and estimates in one period reduce their ability to make 
similar judgments and estimates in the subsequent periods. Given the articulation between the income 
statement and the balance sheet, any accruals included in earnings are also reflected in net assets. Thus, 
the extent to which earnings can be biased up through accruals decreases with the extent to which net 
assets are already overstated. Collectively, AEM is constrained by the scrutiny from regulators and 
auditors as well as the accounting flexibility within firms’ financial reporting systems.   
Prior literature shows that firms’ geographic locations affect firms’ information environment and 
liquidity. Investors exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms (Coval and Moskowitz 
1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Huberman 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005) and tend to earn 
substantially higher returns in local stocks (Coval and Moskowitz 2001; Hau 2001). Studies also show 
that the superiority of local stock returns occurs because their proximity provides investors with an 
information advantage (Coval and Moskowitz 1999&2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005; Malloy 2005). 
Along with this line, Loughran and Schultz (2005) argue that urban stocks are more likely to be local 
stocks because urban firms have a greater investor base. Moreover, they show that urban firms are 
associated with higher trading volume, more analyst following, and higher institutional ownership. 
Loughran (2007) further suggests that urban firms have an information advantage over rural firms 
because informal information (i.e., soft information) is more easily accessible to people physically 
nearby. In summary, urban firms have greater investor familiarity, resulting in lower information 
asymmetry (Urcan 2007; Loughran 2007&2008; Baik, Kang, and Kim 2010) and higher monitoring 
effectiveness (Ayres, Ramalingegowda, and Teung 2011; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011; John et al. 2011).  
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We extend previous studies by investigating the relation between geographic location and 
accounting-related outcomes. Whether firms’ locations (urban vs. rural) influence managers’ earnings 
management decisions is an important research question for two reasons. First, as pointed out in Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2012), prior research on earnings management has focused on how, why, and when 
managers manage earnings, but very few studies have explored where firms manage earnings. Their study 
is the first trying to fill up the gap by documenting that earnings management is most likely to take place 
in domestic income rather than foreign income. Our study addresses this research question by further 
investigating whether how managers manage earnings (REM vs. AEM) is conditional on where the firm 
is located (urban vs. rural). Second, prior literature shows that the tradeoff decisions between REM and 
AEM are driven by their relative costs. With recent interests of the impact of soft information on firms’ 
liquidity and various financial policies (Bertomeu and Marinovic 2016; Liberti and Petersen 2018), we 
expect that firms’ geographic locations affect management earnings management choice, i.e., REM vs. 
AEM., through changing firms’ information asymmetry and monitoring effectiveness.  
Following prior studies (Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Zhu 2002; Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005; 
Malloy 2005; Loughran and Schultz 2005; John et al. 2011), we use Compustat data on firms’ 
headquarters locations to classify each firm as urban or rural. Following Loughran and Schultz (2005) and 
John et al. (2011), we define a firm as an urban firm if its headquarters is in one of the ten largest 
metropolitan areas in the United States, i.e., New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San 
Francisco, Boston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Philadelphia, Houston, Miami, and their suburbs, based on the 
2010 Census1.  We measure geographic location with metro statistical area (Urban), which is equal to one 
if a firm is located in one of these ten metropolitan areas, and zero otherwise. We measure earnings 
management with accrual earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM). We 
follow Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) to measure AEM using performance-matched discretionary 
                                                          
1 In addition, we adopt two alternative proxies to classify urban and rural firms: (1) the distance to major airports, 
and (2) the number of top 100 cities within 100-mile radius. 
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accruals, and Roychowdhury (2006) and Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2016) to measure REM 
with abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. Following Zang (2012), we further 
combine these two proxies of REM to an aggregate REM measure because some firms engage in both.  
Employing a large generalizable sample of firm-years between 1996 and 2013, we find that, 
urban firms have a lower aggregate REM attributable to lower overproduction, and higher discretionary 
accruals when compared to rural firms. This evidence suggests that the lower information asymmetry and 
better governance in the urban firms help reduce managers’ use of the value-destroying REM. We further 
investigate whether the association between firms’ complexity and managers’ earnings management 
decisions varies with firms’ geographic locations. Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) posit that 
complex firms should be associated with higher REM.  However, we find while such positive association 
exists in rural firms, it is reversed in urban firms, consistent with the argument that easy access to 
informal information overcomes the difficulty of monitoring and thus reduces value-destring REM. 
Lastly, we explore whether the influence of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) on managers’ earnings 
management varies across urban firms and rural firms. Consistent with Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008), we 
find that firms, on average, engage in more REM after the passage of SOX. However, the post-SOX 
increase in REM is only attributable to rural firms, as urban firms experience a significant reduction in 
REM after the passage of SOX.   
 We conduct several supplemental analyses to corroborate our main analyses. First, following 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), we test management tradeoff decision between REM and 
AEM using a subsample of earnings management suspect firms. To alleviate concerns of the selection 
bias in the suspect subsample, we adopt a Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. This result echoes our 
baseline results. Second, following Loughran and Schultz (2005), Loughran (2008), and John et al. 
(2011), we adopt two alternative proxies to classify urban and rural firms: (1) the distance to major 
airports, and (2) the number of top 100 cities within a 100-mile radius. The results are unchanged using 
these two alternative proxies. Third, by considering the possibility that managers determine REM and 
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AEM simultaneously, we implement a simultaneous equation model to allow the endogenous correlation 
of these two earnings management activities. The results are consistent with our main findings.  
 In summary, this study suggests that urban firms’ managers tend to use less REM and more AEM 
than rural firms’ managers. Furthermore, complexity increases REM in rural firms, but the incremental 
effect is mitigated in urban firms. Lastly, we find that managers’ choice of using more REM after the 
passage of SOX addressed in previous studies is driven mainly by rural firms. Our study offers several 
contributions. First, we complement the literature on earnings management. We provide evidence 
showing that the significant effect of geographic location on managers’ earnings management decisions is 
incremental to a battery of broader corporate characteristics and accounting determinants identified in the 
existing studies. Second, Dyreng et al. (2012) take the first step to explore where firms manage earnings 
using multinational firms. Our study makes an incremental contribution to this stream of research by 
showing where firms are located affects how they manage earnings. Although decades of research has 
focused on how, why, and when firms manage earnings, very few studies have explored whether these 
questions are conditional on where firms are located. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first 
that combines these two streams of research. Third, our study extends the geographic location literature to 
accounting. Recent studies provide evidence that firms’ geographic location influences firms’ liquidity, 
information dissemination, and corporate payout policy. Our study adds to this literature by showing that 
firms’ geographic location is also related to managers’ accounting decisions, such as managers’ earnings 
management decisions. Fourth, prior literature suggests that managers of firms with more volatile 
operating environment and organizational complexity have a greater scope of moral hazard (Demsetz and 
Lehn 1985; Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith 2004). We extend this literature by showing the influence 
of complexity on moral hazard is conditional on firms’ geographic location. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review the prior relevant 
literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design, including measurements of 
geographic location, REM, and AEM. In section 4, we report sample selection and descriptive statistics. 
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Section 5 discusses the main results, and section 6 presents the additional tests. The last section concludes 
and discusses the implication of our results. 
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Geographic Location and Firm Financial Decisions 
There is a growing interest in the recent literature examining the effects of geographic location on 
firm financial decisions. Early research in this field documents that investors have a strong preference for 
locally-headquartered firms. It is well established that investors prefer domestic firms over foreign firms, 
and among domestic firms, investors prefer firms that are located nearby. For example, Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) find that one out of ten companies in investment managers’ portfolio is located in the 
same city as the investment manager. Individual investors are even more biased toward locally- 
headquartered companies. As shown in Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), individual investors invest 31% 
of their portfolio in local stocks.  
The prior literature documents two reasons for investors’ bias toward local firms. The first reason 
emphasizes investors’ greater familiarity towards local firms (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Huberman 
2001). Using a sample of Finnish firms, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that the familiarity is due to 
close proximity, the same language, and the same culture. Furthermore, this familiarity matters more to 
individual investors and less-informed institutional investors. Huberman (2001) speculates that just as 
people root for their home team, investors are more comfortable to invest in the business that is visible to 
them. Second, investors have an information advantage on local firms. Coval and Moskowits (2001) find 
that the abnormal returns earned in nearby firms are attributable to fund managers’ information advantage 
over local stocks. Hau (2001) documents similar evidence using a sample of professional traders. He 
shows that professional traders’ superior trading performance does not come from the location in the 
financial center or the affiliation with a large financial institution but from geographical proximity to the 
corporate headquarters. In addition to the fund managers and professional traders, individual investors 
also have an advantage in obtaining information of local investments. For instance, Ivkovic and 
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Weisbenner (2005) find that the average individual investor earns 3.2% higher annual return from local 
investments than nonlocal investments. Similar to investors, analysts express the same preference to local 
stocks. For example, O’Brien and Tan (2015) show that analysts are 80% more likely to cover local firms 
than nonlocal ones. Malloy (2005) and Jennings, Lee, and Matsumoto (2017) posit that geographically-
proximate analysts possess information advantage, which leads to more accurate forecasts. In sum, 
numerous studies document that familiarity and easy access to information lead to investors’ and analysts’ 
bias toward local firms.  
Loughran and Schultz (2005) further extend the difference between local and nonlocal firms to 
the dissimilarity between urban and rural firms. They argue that urban firms are more likely to be local 
firms while rural firms are more likely to be nonlocal firms. First, because urban firms are located near 
more sophisticated money managers and a greater individual investor base than rural firms, urban firms 
are more likely to be familiar to more investors. Second, investors have difficulty accessing the informal 
information of firms located in remote areas. As a result, rural firms are covered by fewer analysts, owned 
by fewer institutions, traded much less by investors, and have higher trading costs. These findings add to 
our understanding that the geographic location of the firm, urban vs. rural, affects its liquidity. Loughran 
(2007) further suggests that the differences between urban and rural firms lead information to be spread 
from urban firms to rural firms. One of the key contributions of this paper is to point out the role of the 
informal ways in which information is discovered and diffused: through the conversations with 
employees or customers, the local media coverage, and the sophisticated investors. Therefore, it is easier 
and cheaper to obtain information from urban firms.  
2.2 Management Earnings Management 
Managerial compensation incentives, borrowing cost, and equity offering provide managers with 
incentives to manipulate reported earnings (e.g., Dechow and Skinner 2000; Dichev and Skinner 2002; 
Cheng and Warfield 2005). Managers influence financial performance measures through accrual and 
accounting decisions (AEM) and through operational activities (REM).  
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AEM is achieved through changing reporting methods and estimates in order to alter reported 
earnings in a particular direction. The difference between net income and cash flows is referred to as 
accruals, which can be categorized into discretionary and non-discretionary components. Non-
discretionary accruals result naturally from business conditions such as accounting timing difference, 
rather than from managers’ manipulation of earnings. In general, non-discretionary accruals are not of 
major concern to earnings quality (Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986). However, discretionary accruals are the 
accrual component chosen by managers to adjust a firm’s cash flows and manipulate its earnings within 
the flexibility of accounting rules (Dechow 1994). Due to their discretionary nature, discretionary 
accruals are of concern on firms’ earnings quality. Examples of discretionary accruals include increasing 
or decreasing estimates of bad debt reserves, warranty costs, and inventory write-downs. Given the 
reversing nature of the accruals, AEM borrows earnings from future periods to improve current earnings. 
As a result, this method of earnings management has high detection risk and one-to-one cost of earnings 
reduction in future periods. 
REM is defined as management’s operational activities to increase current period earnings, which 
is achieved by overproducing inventory to lower the cost of goods sold (COGS) or cutting discretionary 
expenditures (i.e., advertising expenditures, R&D expenditures, SG&A expenditures) to improve reported 
earnings. In other words, REM is management’s intentional action that deviates from normal business 
practices and has suboptimal business consequences. According to Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008), there has 
been an increase in the use of REM since the passage of SOX in 2002. REM is found by numerous 
studies to be value-destroying. For example, Roychowdhury (2006, p338) suggests that REM has a 
negative effect on a firm’s performance by stating that “real activities manipulation can reduce firm value 
because actions taken in the current period to increase earnings can have a negative effect on cash flows 
in future periods.” Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine the relationship between REM activities of 
Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) firms and post-SEO firm performance and find that the decline in post-
SEO operating performance is largely due to REM activities. Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee, and Soderstrom 
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(2011) find that the use of REM in nonprofit hospitals is associated with negative future performance. In 
addition, Abernathy, Beyer, and Rapley (2014) also argue that the use of REM may hurt a firm’s future 
performance. For example, if managers cut R&D expenditures to increase the current year’s earnings, the 
future performance may be hurt due to the lost opportunities from reduced R&D activities. Taken 
together, the formerly mentioned studies suggest a negative impact of REM on future firm performance.2 
AEM changes the reported earnings by choosing the accounting methods or estimates without 
changing the underlying transactions, while REM changes the reported earnings by manipulating firms’ 
operating activities. Both AEM and REM are costly activities, and managers make tradeoff decisions 
between these two manipulation methods based on their relative costs and constraints. Consistent with the 
survey study by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), Cohen at al. (2008) document that firms switch 
from AEM to REM to manage reported earnings after the passage of SOX in 2002 because REM has 
lower detection risk. Furthermore, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine how firms tradeoff AEM and 
REM around seasoned equity offering (SEO) and find that the negative impact of REM on post-SEO 
performance is more severe than AEM. Zang (2012) shows that firms substitute AEM for REM, or vice 
versa, depending on the relative costs of each earnings management strategy. She further documents that 
managers adjust the level of AEM according to the level of REM realized. Overall, the prior literature 
shows that AEM and REM are two common methods firms use to manage earnings and that these 
methods have different costs and constraints. Therefore, managers substitute AEM for REM, or vice 
versa, to manage earnings under different circumstances.  
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
2.3.1 Main Hypothesis 
Extant research on earnings management focuses on how, why, and when managers manage 
earnings (e.g. Dyreng et al., 2012). However, one of the important aspects of earnings management that 
                                                          
2 Gunny (2010) suggests that managers who engage in REM to just meet earnings benchmarks have better 
subsequent performance than firms that do not engage in REM and miss earnings benchmarks.  
10 
 
has not gained enough attention is whether how firms manage earnings depends on where the firm is 
located at. As the costs of REM and AEM are likely to be conditional on firm location, we contend that 
where firms are located (urban vs. rural) influences how firms manage earnings (REM vs. AEM).  
On one hand, we expect urban firms to have a lower level of REM and a higher level of AEM 
than rural firms for the following two reasons. First, the geographic proximity between urban firms and 
outside investors and financial analysts increases familiarity, reduces information asymmetry, and lowers 
the information acquisition costs. As the cost of monitoring is conditional on the information acquisition 
cost, urban firms are associated with strengthened monitoring.  Hence, under the pressure of meeting 
earnings target, urban firms are less likely to use REM because of the negative influence of REM in long-
term firm value. Second, compared to AEM, REM is harder to detect by outsiders without access to inside 
information. As investors have easier access to the informal information of urban firms and become more 
familiar to the urban firms, they are likely to have a better understanding of the firms’ operation, thus a 
strengthened ability to identify REM and to understand its negative long-term implications. Because 
REM and AEM can be used as substitutes in earnings management (Zang, 2012), we expect urban firms 
to have a lower level of REM and a higher level of AEM than rural firms. 
On the other hand, it is possible that we fail to find empirical evidence to support our expectation. 
First, urban firms are under greater scrutiny from auditors and regulators. The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is a regulatory and enforcement agency, headquartered in Washington D.C, 
with 11 regional offices across the country.3  Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) shows that firms located closer 
to the SEC, which are more likely to be urban firms in our sample, are less likely to restate their financial 
statements. Second, prior literature shows a variety of firm-specific characteristics that lead to firms’ 
choice between AEM and REM (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012). If the effect of a firm’s 
geographic location on earnings management choice correlates with the effect of firm characteristics 
                                                          
3 The eleven SEC regional offices are located in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Fort Worth, Los Angeles, 
Miami, New York, Philadelphia, Salt Lake City, and San Francisco. Nine of the ten cities classified as Metro areas 
in our study have an SEC regional office. 
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identified in the prior literature, we may fail to find a meaningful influence of firms’ geographic location 
on their earnings management choice.  
According to the above discussion, the relation between firms’ geographic locations and their 
earnings management choice is an open, empirical question. Therefore, we address the research question 
by studying the following null hypothesis: 
H1: There is no relation between firm geographic location and managers’ earnings management 
decisions. 
 
2.3.2 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
 We further explore two cross-sectional predictions that examine the variation in investors’ access 
to informal information and monitoring effectiveness.    
Variation in Firm Complexity 
 The seminal paper by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggests that managers of firms with more 
volatile operating environments have a higher degree of moral hazard. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1999) support Demsetz and Lehn (1985) by documenting additional firm characteristics, such as R&D 
and advertising, proxy for the scope of managerial discretion. Furthermore, Bushman, Chen, Engel, and 
Smith (2004) expand the characteristics of the scope of moral hazard by adding organizational complexity 
as another component. Collectively, these studies conjecture that managers use more discretion in more 
complex firms because of the difficulty of monitoring.  Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) and 
Cheng, Lee, Shevlin (2016) show that earnings management increases in firm complexity.  We propose 
that this positive relation is modified by firm location.  Urban firms are associated with greater investor 
familiarity and lower asymmetric information, increasing the difficulty of managing earnings without 
being detected. 
Therefore, our next hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: The relation between firm complexity and managers’ earnings management decisions varies 
across firms’ geographic locations.  
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Variation before and after the Passage of SOX 
 Cohen et al. (2008) investigate AEM and REM surrounding the passage of SOX in 2002 and  find 
that AEM increased steadily until the passage of SOX but decreased dramatically after the passage of 
SOX. In contrast, REM declined prior to SOX and increased significantly after SOX. Their results 
suggest that REM is harder to detect and firms switch from AEM to REM in response to the higher 
scrutiny of accounting practice after SOX.  Cohen et al. (2008)’s findings are further supported by Zang 
(2012). As investors gain familiarity of urban firms through easy access to the informal information, 
REM are more likely to be identified by investors. Thus, we expect the influence of SOX on earnings 
management decisions to be stronger in rural firms.  Thus, we expect the effect of SOX on earnings 
management decisions is conditional on firm location. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
H3: The influence of SOX on earnings management decisions varies across firms’ geographic 
locations. 
III. Research Design 
3.1  Measurements of Geographic Location 
Consistent with existing literature, we identify firms’ geographic locations with their headquarters 
locations obtained from Compustat (Loughran and Schultz 2005; Loughran 2007&2008; John et al. 2011; 
Gao, Ng, and Wang 2011).  Using the 2010 Census, we classify urban firms as those headquartered in one 
of the ten largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) and rural firms as those headquartered in other 
areas.  Specifically, the indicator variable Urban is given a value of 1 if a firm’s headquarters is in New 
York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco, Boston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Philadelphia, 
Houston, and Miami, and zero in other areas.   
In the robustness check, we use alternative measures to define urban vs. rural firms. A longer 
distance to major airports imposes higher transportation costs and inconvenience to outside monitors, 
which may reduce their visits to the firm to obtain firsthand information (Loughran 2008; John et al. 
2011) and consequently the effectiveness of monitoring (John et al. 2011).  The Federal Aviation 
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Administration (FAA) classifies major airports as the large and medium-sized commercial service airport 
hubs that account for at least 0.25% of total passenger boarding. We create an indicator variable, Urban1, 
which equals one if the minimum distance between a company’s headquarters and a major airport is 
below the sample median and zero otherwise.  Similarly, location proximity to large cities makes firms 
more accessible to outside analysts and institutional investors, leading to reduced information asymmetry 
and improved monitoring effectiveness.  Urban2 is an indicator variable equals to one if the number of 
top 100 cities within 100 miles radius from a firm’s headquarters is above the sample median and zero 
otherwise.   
3.2  Measurements of Earnings Management 
3.2.1  Real earnings management 
Following the existing literature (Roychowdhury 2006; Kim , Park, and Weir 2012; McGuire, 
Omer, and Sharp 2012; Brown, Chen, and Kim 2015; Chen, Lee, and Shevlin 2016), we investigate 
managerial manipulation of real activities with two individual metrics and one aggregate metrics 
(RMAGGREGATE).  The two individual metrics include overproducing inventory to reduce COGS (RMPROD) 
and cutting discretionary expenses (RMDISX), such as R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenses.  Because 
managers may engage in both methods to artificially inflate reported earnings (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; 
McGuire et al. 2012), we capture the total effect by using the sum of abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenditures (RMAGGREGATE = RMPROD + RMDISX).   
Abnormally high production cost (RMPROD) occurs when managers spread the fixed production 
costs over a higher number of units produced through overproducing inventory. To calculate 
overproduction (RMPROD), we begin by estimating the normal production level using the model in 
Roychowdhury (2006), where 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the sum of COGS and the change in inventory during the year: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘4
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
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We estimate equation (1) each year across all industries with a minimum of 15 observations, 
where industries are classified using two-digit SIC.7 Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2016) posit that 
some firms may systematically deviate from industry-year norms, resulting in model misspecification. We 
follow their recommendations to control this issue.  First, we estimate the deviation in a firm’s production 
costs from the cross-sectional mean each year, and then calculate the changes in the deviations from year 
t-1 to t.  Second, we run the model (1) and estimate the residual for each sample observation.  Lastly, we 
calculate the abnormal production cost (RMPROD) as the difference between the firm-year residual and the 
mean residual of the sample in each year.  A higher value of abnormal production costs (RMPROD) 
indicates a more aggressive real earnings management through reducing the COGS. 
To capture firms’ real earnings management activities through cutting discretionary expenditures 
(RMDISX), we first follow Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate the levels of normal discretionary 
expenditures using the following equation: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (2) 
Where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the discretionary expenditures, including R&D, advertising, and SG&A 
expenditures in year t.  Model (2) is estimated cross-sectionally for industry-years with a minimum of 15 
observations. The abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is the difference between the actual level 
and the predicted level.  We then follow Kothari et al. (2016) to adjust the above calculated abnormal 
level of discretionary expenditures to the difference between the estimated residuals and the mean value 
of the residuals across sample years for the same firm.  As in Zang (2012), we multiply the residuals by 
negative one to obtain RMDISX.  As such, a higher value of RMDISX indicates more aggressive real earnings 
management through cutting discretionary expenditures.   
                                                          
7 We also use Fama and French 48 industries classification and still obtain similar results. 
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3.2.2  Accrual earnings management 
We measure accruals with the performance-matched discretionary accruals, constructed as the 
difference in the discretionary accruals between the firm and its matching firm, which is selected from the 
same industry classified using two-digit SIC code and has the closest return on assets (ROA) each year 
(Kothari, Leon, and Wasley 2005).  The discretionary accruals are the difference between firms’ actual 
and normal accruals, which are the residuals estimated from modified Jones (1991) model cross-
sectionally for each industry-year using the following equation: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡      (3) 
Where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus 
the operating cash flows reported in the statement of cash flows in year t (Hribar and Collins 2002).   
3.3  Empirical Specification 
We adopt the following model to investigate the impact of a firm’s geographic location on 
earnings management, where 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is one of the four earnings management proxies: (1) RMAGGREGATE, (2) 
RMPROD, (3) RMDISX, and (4) Discretional accrual DA for firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡:   
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑈𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡      (4) 
The variable of interest is 𝑈𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑁, which is given a value of one for urban firms and a value of 
zero for rural firms.  
We control CEO compensation, board structure, and accounting variables related to earnings 
management in the existing literature to mitigate the concern that the effect of geographic location merely 
captures their effects. Managers with greater sensitivity of personal wealth to firm stock price have 
strengthened incentives to manipulate earnings (Cheng and Warfield 2005, Wang and Warfield 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Jiang, Petroni, and Wang 2010). However, Hribar and Nichols (2007), 
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006), and Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010) show that the 
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positive relation is due to model misspecification.  CEO ownership is measured with Delta, which is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the change in the value of CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the 
value of the firm’s common stock price (Core and Guay 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Neveen 2006).  Tying 
CEO wealth to stock return volatility, option compensation encourages CEOs to take risky investments. 
Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) document a positive association between Vega and 
accounting irregularities.  We control CEO risk-taking incentives with Vega, constructed as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the change in the value of CEO’s stock option portfolio for a 1% change in the 
annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. We also control CEO annual compensation 
Tdc1, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the total annual compensation. CEOs with 
shorter tenure are less known to the labor market and may adopt policies to favorably influence the 
market’s perception of their quality (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; 
Holmstrom 1999), resulting a higher incentive to inflate earnings (Ali and Zhang 2015).  We measure 
CEO tenure with CEO tenure, constructed as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years a CEO 
has serviced as CEO.  
Effective board monitoring reduces the likelihood of managerial manipulation of earnings 
(Beasley 1996).  We measure the quality of board monitoring with the percentage of independent 
directors and the board gender diversity.  Studies document a negative relation between earnings 
management and independent director representation (Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Xie, Davidson, and 
DaDalt 2003; Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2005). Percentage of independent director, Pind, is the number 
of directors who are not employees or linked to firms through business relationships scaled by the total 
number of directors.  Female directors are more likely to check on CEO decisions than male directors and 
thus represent good governance (Dallas 2002; Valenti 2008).  A higher percentage of female directors are 
associated with higher earnings quality (Peni and Vahamaa 2010; Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011).  The 
gender diversity, Per_female_dir, is the ratio of number of female directors to the number of total 
directors.   
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Analysts may prevent earnings manipulation through effective monitoring, or induce earnings 
manipulation because firms are under pressure of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  We use Analyst, 
constructed as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm, to control the 
influence of analysts on earnings management.  The market rewards firms’ beat or meet earnings 
forecasts with higher return and punish firms’ miss forecasts with a significant drop in stock prices 
(Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Kasznik and McNicholes 2002).  Firms who have the habit of beating 
earnings forecasts may be under higher pressure to continue to do so, resulting in more earnings 
management (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012). Beat is the number of times that a firm’s actual EPS 
is larger than the mean analysts’ earnings forecasts in the past four quarters.  In addition to independent 
directors and female directors, auditors can constrain manipulative earnings management through 
effective monitoring. Big 8 is an indicator variable equals to one if firms have one of the big 8 auditing 
firms as their auditor, and zero otherwise.  Auditors’ experience and ability to detect earnings 
management increases in their tenure.  Auditor_tenure is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
years an auditor has served as an auditor for a firm. 
Barton and Simko (2002) indicate that net operating assets position represents previous earnings 
management. NOA is calculated as the sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities 
plus total debt at the beginning of the year, scaled by the lagged total assets. Firms with higher growth are 
likely to face greater pressure from the capital markets and thus are more likely to conduct earnings 
management (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 2006; Armstrong et al. 2013).  We 
measure firms’ growth rate with Size, Tobin’s Q, Intangibles, and Firm_age. Lastly, we include firm 
profitability (ROA) and capital structure (Leverage) (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010).  
The variable definitions are presented in Appendix A.  
IV. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample is a merged sample from Execucomp, Compustat, CRSP, and Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) in the period of 1996 to 2013.  Following the existing literature, we exclude 
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firms in financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utility industries (SIC codes 4900-4949) because 
these firms are likely to have different financial reporting incentives due to their different regulations.  
After deleting missing values on key variables, we have an unbalanced final sample of 10,660 firm-year 
observations.8   
Panel A and Panel B in Table 1 present sample descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
results, respectively.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the sample 
distribution to mitigate potential bias arising from the sample outliers.  As shown in Panel A, 40.35% of 
our sample firms are classified as urban-located using Urban as the proxy.  50.2% of firms are defined as 
urban-located when the distance to major airports is used as proxy, and 28.61% of firms are urban-located 
when the number of large cities within 100 miles of radiance is used.  The mean and median value of 
RMAGGREGATE are 0.042 and 0.0311, respectively.  RMPROD has the mean (median) of 0.0062 (0.0066), and 
RMDISX has the mean (median) of 0.0364 (0.0238).  The mean and median value of DA are -0.0238 and -
0.02, respectively.  All variable distributions are consistent with existing studies.  
We segment the sample into two subsamples based on the location of each firm, urban vs. rural.  
The univariate tests of the mean difference for earnings management variables, CEO compensation 
variables, and variables proxy for the board and auditor monitoring effectiveness are presented in Panel 
B.  On average, rural firms are associated with significantly higher aggregate REM. In addition, rural 
firms’ REM is mainly through overproduction. Further, rural firms have significantly less AEM than 
urban firms.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations among key variables.  URBAN is negatively 
correlated with RMAGGREGATE (Pearson correlation of -0.0272) and RMPROD (Pearson correlation of -0.0452), 
                                                          
8 Our initial sample is a merged sample from Compustat and Execucomp, which include 19,286 firm-year observatiosn.  This 
sample size is redued to 15,844 firm-year observations after merging with I/B/E/S.  The sample size is further reduced to 11, 838 
firm-year observations after merging with ISS.  After deleting missing values on key variables, we have 10,660 firm-year 
observations.   
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but positively correlated with DA (Pearson correlation of 0.0234). In addition, consistent with prior 
studies, we find a significant positive relation between RMPROD and RMDISX (Pearson correlation of 
0.3934), between Delta and RMAGGREGATE (Pearson correlation of 0.0473), between Vega and RMAGGREGATE 
(Pearson correlation of 0.032), and a significant negative relation between Delta and DA (Pearson 
correlation of -0.043), between Vega and DA (Pearson correlation of -0.064).   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
V. Results 
We provide our main results in this section.  All models include industry and year variables to 
control omitted variable bias due to different industry characteristics and time effects, and are estimated 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the standard errors robust to heterogeneity.   
5.1  The Association between Firms’ Geographic Locations and Earnings Management 
Table 3 presents the results of tests on the association between earnings management and urban 
location.  The dependent variables are RMAGGREGATE, RMPROD, RMDISX, and DA in models (1), (2), (3), and 
(4), respectively.  The coefficient on indicator variable URBAN is negative and significant at 1% level in 
models (1) and (2), suggesting that urban firms are associated with lower aggregate real earnings 
management that mainly comes from overproducing inventory.  The parameter estimates on URBAN in 
models (1) and (2) indicate firms in urban locations are associated with a 0.0119 reduction in 
RMAGGREGATE and a 0.008 reduction in RMPROD, respectively. This supports our hypothesis H1.  The 
coefficient on DA is 0.0044 with significance at 1% level, suggesting that accrual earnings management 
in urban firms is higher than that rural firms by 0.0044.  Collectively, we find that firms in urban 
locations significantly reduce the extent of real earnings management, but increase accrual earnings 
management. 
The results of control variables are generally consistent with the literature.  Firms offer CEOs 
with higher equity incentives are associated with more earnings management (Cheng and Warfield 2015; 
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Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian 2008).  
Executives adopt real earnings management to boost future performance in response to analysts’ pressure 
(Irani and Oesch 2016).  Firms with higher Tobin’s Q and intangible assets conduct more real earnings 
management and less earnings management through discretionary accruals.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.2  Variation in Firm Complexity 
The effectiveness of monitoring in constraining manipulative activities to inflate earnings should 
be conditional on firms operating complexity. Complex firms and firms operate in an R&D intensive 
industry have greater incentives to conduct earnings management (Chen et al. 2016). As such, we expect 
location proximity to shareholders has a greater impact on earnings management in those firms.   
Following Chen et al. (2016), we measure R&D intensity with IND_RD, which equals to one if the 
average R&D expenditure in the industry-year is above the sample median and zero otherwise, where 
industries are classified using two-digit SIC code.  We employ Coles et al. (2008) to classify complex 
firms with size, leverage, and age.  Specifically, we conduct factor analysis to convert these three 
variables into an indicator variable Complex with a value of one if its value is above the sample median 
and zero otherwise.   
We interact IND_RD and Complex separately with URBAN and report the results in Panels A and 
B of Table 4, respectively. In Panel A, the coefficient on URBAN is insignificant in models (1), (2), and 
(3), which indicates that firms’ geographic locations have no influence on real earnings management in 
non-complex firms.  The coefficient on IND_RD is significantly positive in models (1) and (2), 
suggesting that firms with greater R&D intensity are more likely to use REM when they are located in 
rural areas where information accessibility and effective monitoring are weakened.  However, the 
significantly negative coefficient on the interaction between URBAN and IND_RD in models (1), (2), and 
(3) implies that, compared to rural firms, urban firms with high R&D intensity employ less REM. 
21 
 
Specifically, the parameter estimates on the interaction between URBAN and IND_RD in models (1), (2) 
and (3) indicate that, in firms with high R&D intensity, the usage of RMAGGREGATE, RMPROD, and RMDISX 
in urban firms are lower than rural firms by -0.0299, -0.0166, and -0.0145, respectively. Furthermore, the 
sum of the coefficient of IND_RD and the interaction between URBAN and IND_RD is insignificant, 
suggesting better monitoring in urban firms offsets the increased incentives for REM in high R&D 
intensity firms.   
Similar results are found when investigating the moderating effect of firms’ complexity on the 
association between real earnings management and geographic locations.  Specifically, consistent with 
Chen et al. (2016), we find complex firms utilize more real earnings management.  However, when firms 
are located in urban areas where information accessibility and effective monitoring are strengthened, such 
real earnings management are largely reduced. Collectively, we find strong support for H3.  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
5.3  Variation before and after the Passage SOX  
Graham et al. (2005) and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) document a reduction in accrual earnings 
management and an increase in real earnings management post-SOX.  They propose that the strengthened 
information disclosure requirements introduced in SOX make accrual-based earnings management more 
detectable and thus costly, creating incentives for firms to adopt real earnings management.  We expect 
the greater monitoring effectiveness and information accessibility in urban located firms reduce 
managerial incentives to switch to value-decreasing real activities manipulations in the post-SOX period.  
We create an indicator variable SOX that equals to one if the fiscal year is after 2003 and zero otherwise 
(Chen et al. 2016).  We interact SOX with URBAN to investigate the change in the association between 
location proximity and earnings management induced by the exogenous shock, SOX. The results are 
reported in Table 5.  Consistent with the literature, the coefficient on SOX in real earnings management 
regressions is significantly positive, which suggests that rural firms implement more manipulative real 
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activities in earnings management post-SOX.  Moreover, the coefficients on the interactions in models 
(1), (2), and (3) are significantly negative, indicating that the location proximity to large investor base of 
urban firms effectively mitigates increased real earnings management post-SOX. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
VI. Additional Tests 
We recognize that our analyses might be subject to endogeneity concerns because, arguably, the 
urban location may be a proxy for some governance mechanisms and/or accounting variables 
uncontrolled in the model which affect the extent of earnings management. We mitigate this concern by 
including a comprehensive list of control variables in our main analysis that is likely to be related to 
governance quality, such as proxies for CEO power and board monitoring effectiveness, and various 
accounting variables found to be related to managerial manipulative actions in prior studies. In this 
session, we carry out several additional tests to check whether our results are driven by biases in the 
sample selection, variable identification, or endogeneity.   
6.1  Heckman Selection Model 
Firms that just meet or beat important earnings benchmarks are more likely to manage earnings 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002).  
Following prior studies, we classify firms as earnings management suspects when they have earnings that 
just beat/meet the prior year’s earnings, zero earnings, and analysts’ consensus forecast.  We address the 
potential bias arising from the systematic difference in firms more and less likely to engage earnings 
management with Heckman (1979) two-step selection model (Zang 2012).  In the first step, we estimate 
the likelihood of being earnings management suspects using all sample firms and obtain the inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR) with the following model, where 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 is an indicator variable with a value of one if a firm 
just beats or meets one of the aforementioned earnings benchmarks and zero otherwise: 
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𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠𝑄 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖      (5)                                    
We control CEO compensation with Bonus, which is the CEO’s annual bonus compensation, and 
Option, which is the accumulated value of CEO option portfolio (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). We 
standardize them by dividing them by the total annual compensation (TDC1), and further adjust the 
skewness by taking the natural logarithm of one plus their standardized values). The independent 
variables are chosen according to prior literature (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Zang 
2012).  In the second step, we repeat the analyses as those in Table 3 using only suspect firms with IMR 
as an additional control variable to correct for sample selection bias.  The results are presented in Table 6. 
Panel A reports the results of the first stage of the Heckman selection model. Firms provide CEOs 
with higher option compensation, followed by more analysts, and have higher growth opportunities and 
profitability have higher propensity to be classified as suspects (Barth, Elliott, and Finn 1999; Skinner and 
Sloan 2002; and Zang 2012). Panel B presents the results of the second stage of the Heckman model. 
There are 1,831 firms identified as earnings management suspects. Controlling for the potential sample 
selection bias, we find the coefficient on URBAN is negative and significant in the model (1) and (2), 
suggesting that urban firms are associated with significantly fewer earnings management through 
manipulating real activities, measured by both RMAGGREGATE and RMPROD.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
6.2  Alternative Measures of Urban Firms 
To check the robustness of the classification of urban firms, we define urban located firms with 
two alternative proxies, the distance to major airports and the number of top 100 cities within 100the -
mile radiance.  We use the sample median as a cutoff point to create two indicator variables, Metro1 and 
Metro2, and repeat the analyses as those in Table 3.  The results are largely consistent.  The coefficients 
on both urban location proxies are negative and significant in real earnings management models, implying 
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firms adopt less value-decreasing real earnings management when they are subject to strengthened 
oversight in urban locations.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
6.3  Simultaneous Equation Model 
Earnings management through manipulation of real activities and financial reporting are likely to 
be correlated. Studies show that firms may use discretionary accruals when they fail to use only real 
earnings management to meet analysts’ forecast.  As such, we implement a simultaneous system of 
equations to allow the correlation between real and accrual earnings management.  Specifically, we 
estimate a system of two equations using three-stage least squares estimator: 
𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑁 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽10𝑁𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽12𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄 + 𝛽13𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒 +
𝛽16𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽17𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖                 (6)                                                                                                                
𝐷𝐴 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑑𝑐1 +  𝛽4𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4 +
𝛽9𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽10𝑁𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽12𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄 + 𝛽13𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                      (7)                                                                                                                     
Where URBAN is the urban location proxy. We control for industry and year effects in all 
regressions.  We assume 𝑈𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑁, 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡, 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡, 𝐵𝑖𝑔, 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 and 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄 as additional 
endogenous variables. 
The results are reported in Table 8. Model (1) and (2) present the results when the dependent 
variable is total real earnings management and accrual earnings management, respectively.  The 
coefficient on URBAN in the model (1) is -0.0122 with a significance level of 1%, implying that urban 
firms are associated with a reduction in 𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒  of 0.0122 than rural firms.  The coefficient on 
URBAN in the model (2) is significant with a value of 0.0087, which indicates that accrual earnings 
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management in urban firms is higher than rural firms by 0.0087.  Collectively, our robustness tests results 
are consistent with our baseline results.   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
VII. Conclusion 
In this study, we introduce a new concept, corporate proximity to the metro area, to the 
accounting research. Following Loughran and Schultz (2005) and John et al. (2011), we classify 
companies as urban or rural based on the proximity of a company’s headquarters to top ten U.S. 
metropolitan areas. We provide large-sample evidence supporting the significant impact of firms’ 
geographic locations (urban vs. rural) on their earnings management decisions, including both real 
earnings management and accrual earnings management.  
Our evidence suggests that urban firms use less REM and more AEM than rural firms. Although 
firm complexity is found to encourage REM in prior studies, we find that such positive relation is 
mitigated in urban firms. In addition, our results indicate that the greater use of REM after the passage of 
SOX is solely driven by rural firms.  Consistent with our main results, when we narrow down our sample 
to earnings management suspect firms, we find that suspect firms in the urban areas are less likely to use 
REM and more likely to use AEM than rural firms. 
We contribute to the earnings management literature in two ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to show how firms manage earnings is conditional on where firms 
located. Prior literature has focused on how, why, and when firms manage earnings, but very few studies 
have explored where firms manage earnings. Second, we show that firms’ geographic locations, as a 
proxy for information accessibility and monitoring effectiveness, influence managers’ tradeoff decisions 
of earnings management activities, incremental to the economic determinants addressed in the prior 
studies.   
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample is a merged sample from Compustat, EXECUCOMP, CRSP, 
and I/B/E/S, and excludes financial firms (SIC 6000–6999) and regulated utilities (SIC 4900–4949).  The sample covers 10,660 
firm-year observations from fiscal year 1996-2013.  Panel A reports the sample descriptive statistics.  Panel B presents univariate 
test results.  Refer to Appendix A. for detailed variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at upper and lower 1% 
of the sample distribution.  
 
Panel A: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
RMAGGREGATE 10,660 0.0420 0.2025 -0.1760 -0.0646 0.0311 0.1375 0.2761 
RMPROD 10,660 0.0062 0.1138 -0.1243 -0.0526 0.0066 0.0654 0.1355 
RMDISX 10,660 0.0364 0.1265 -0.0945 -0.0300 0.0238 0.0898 0.1847 
DA 10,660 -0.0238 0.0756 -0.1130 -0.0628 -0.0200 0.0178 0.0618 
URBAN 10,660 0.4035 0.4906 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Urban1 10,660 0.5020 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Urban2 10,660 0.2861 0.4520 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Delta 10,660 5.5313 1.4614 3.7283 4.5750 5.5197 6.4809 7.3807 
Vega 10,660 3.7798 1.7801 0.6830 2.8729 4.0252 5.0532 5.8711 
Tdc1 10,660 8.0430 0.9964 6.7533 7.3572 8.0599 8.7311 9.3174 
CEO_tenure 10,660 1.7483 0.9179 0.6931 1.0986 1.7918 2.3979 2.9444 
Per_female_dir 10,660 0.0975 0.0961 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.1538 0.2222 
Pind 10,660 0.7141 0.1605 0.5000 0.6250 0.7500 0.8571 0.8889 
Analyst 10,660 2.2583 0.6797 1.3863 1.7918 2.3026 2.7726 3.1355 
Beat 10,660 1.9339 1.3558 0.0000 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 
Big 4 10,660 0.8928 0.3094 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Auditor_tenure 10,660 2.4009 0.7272 1.3863 1.9459 2.4849 2.9444 3.2958 
NOA 10,660 2.3451 1.9907 0.9547 1.2591 1.7701 2.6886 4.2050 
Size 10,660 7.3267 1.4077 5.6343 6.3165 7.2057 8.1916 9.2273 
Tobin's Q 10,660 2.1234 1.3382 1.0503 1.2860 1.7071 2.4508 3.6696 
ROA 10,660 0.0647 0.0934 -0.0155 0.0412 0.0749 0.1097 0.1508 
Leverage 10,660 0.1952 0.1717 0.0000 0.0318 0.1843 0.3030 0.4013 
Firm_age 10,660 2.9304 0.7533 1.9459 2.3979 2.9444 3.4965 3.8501 
Intangibles 10,660 0.4916 0.3564 -0.0384 0.2893 0.5820 0.7714 0.8707 
Litigation 10,660 0.2383 0.4260 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
 
 
Panel B: Univariate Test 
  Rural Metro Difference (p-value) 
RMAGGREGATE 0.0466 0.0353 0.0112 0.0045 
RMPROD 0.0105 0.0000 0.0105 0.0000 
RMDISX 0.0365 0.0363 0.0003 0.9175 
DA -0.0253 -0.0217 -0.0036 0.0158 
Delta 5.5105 5.5620 -0.0515 0.0718 
Vega 3.7817 3.7770 0.0048 0.8930 
Tdc1 7.9803 8.1358 -0.1556 0.0000 
CEO_tenure 1.7271 1.7797 -0.0527 0.0037 
Per_female_dir 0.0977 0.0972 0.0005 0.7805 
Pind 0.7126 0.7164 -0.0037 0.2411 
Analyst 2.2437 2.2799 -0.0362 0.0072 
Beat 1.9220 1.9514 -0.0294 0.2724 
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Table 2 
Correlation 
 
This table presents variable correlations.  The correlations with significance at above 10% level are marked with bold. Refer to Appendix A. for detailed variable definitions.  
 
  
RMAGGREGATE 
              CEO_te
nure 
Per_female
_dir 
    
Analyst 
    
 RMPROD RMDISX DA Urban Delta Vega Tdc1 Pind Beat Big 4 
RMPROD 0.8113              
RMDISX 0.8461 0.3934             
DA 0.0055 0.0599 -0.045            
URBAN -0.0272 -0.0452 -0.001 0.0234           
Delta 0.0473 -0.0225 0.0984 -0.043 0.0173          
Vega 0.032 0.0004 0.0514 -0.064 -0.0013 0.4278         
Tdc1 0.021 -0.0245 0.057 -0.0489 0.0766 0.388 0.499        
CEO_tenure 0.0109 0.0182 0.0022 0.0306 0.0281 0.3303 0.0032 -0.0399       
Per_female_dir 0.0206 0.0128 0.0163 0.0088 -0.0027 0.0741 0.1659 0.2701 -0.1175      
Pind 0.0054 0.0203 -0.0078 0.0038 0.0114 -0.0647 0.1157 0.2795 -0.0418 0.2404     
Analyst 0.0654 0.0041 0.101 -0.0673 0.0261 0.4147 0.3308 0.4636 0.0029 0.1379 0.0907    
Beat -0.0504 -0.0874 -0.0026 -0.0414 0.0106 0.1845 0.0687 0.2002 0.0158 0.0316 0.0776 0.083   
Big 4 0.0168 0.032 -0.0006 -0.0088 -0.0963 0.058 0.117 0.1708 -0.0487 0.1495 0.1603 0.1141 0.0441  
Auditor_tenure 0.0027 0.0185 -0.0126 0.0227 -0.0703 0.0197 0.0595 0.1508 0.0009 0.1272 0.1235 0.0974 -0.0037 0.0582 
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Table 3 
Location and Earnings Management 
 
This table presents regression results of tests on location effect on earnings management. All models control industry and year 
effects, where industry is defined per Fama and French (1997) 49 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses.  Referred to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RMAGGREGATE RMPROD RMDISX DA 
URBAN -0.0119*** -0.0080*** -0.0038 0.0044*** 
 (-2.85) (-3.43) (-1.49) (2.93) 
Delta 0.0075*** 0.0024** 0.0052*** 0.0001 
 (3.80) (2.19) (4.25) (0.16) 
Vega -0.0031** 0.0009 -0.0041*** -0.0014*** 
 (-2.08) (1.09) (-4.54) (-2.72) 
Tdc1 -0.0039 -0.0051*** 0.0013 -0.0031*** 
 (-1.21) (-2.81) (0.67) (-2.60) 
CEO_tenure -0.0007 0.0013 -0.0019 0.0027*** 
 (-0.30) (0.97) (-1.34) (2.89) 
Per_female_dir 0.0429* 0.0184 0.0141 -0.0116 
 (1.81) (1.38) (0.97) (-1.35) 
Pind -0.0016 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0025 
 (-0.11) (0.14) (-0.05) (-0.44) 
Analyst 0.0190*** 0.0042* 0.0150*** -0.0055*** 
 (4.34) (1.75) (5.60) (-3.38) 
Beat -0.0058*** -0.0039*** -0.0019** -0.0030*** 
 (-3.73) (-4.57) (-1.97) (-5.13) 
Big 4 -0.0057 -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0011 
 (-0.83) (-0.60) (-0.74) (-0.41) 
Auditor_tenure -0.0019 0.0014 -0.0030 -0.0001 
 (-0.62) (0.82) (-1.63) (-0.11) 
NOA -0.0248*** -0.0032 -0.0203*** 0.0023 
 (-5.82) (-1.44) (-7.92) (1.44) 
Size 0.0068** 0.0042** 0.0028 0.0029*** 
 (2.26) (2.56) (1.54) (2.62) 
Tobin's Q 0.0160*** -0.0037 0.0180*** -0.0122*** 
 (2.77) (-1.20) (5.23) (-5.52) 
ROA -0.1584*** -0.1817*** 0.0133 0.1694*** 
 (-4.92) (-10.13) (0.67) (13.48) 
Leverage -0.0692*** -0.0309*** -0.0419*** 0.0079 
 (-4.93) (-3.97) (-4.93) (1.54) 
Firm_age 0.0073** 0.0021 0.0054*** 0.0002 
 (2.40) (1.24) (2.91) (0.21) 
Intangibles 0.0526*** 0.0067 0.0467*** -0.0299*** 
 (7.34) (1.63) (10.71) (-10.04) 
Litigation 0.0009 -0.0031 0.0014 -0.0013 
 (0.10) (-0.68) (0.24) (-0.43) 
Constant -0.1633*** -0.0274 -0.1440*** 0.0187 
 (-4.34) (-1.24) (-5.77) (0.89) 
Industry and year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 
R2 0.1051 0.1136 0.1337 0.1028 
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Table 4 
Location and earnings management conditional on firm complexity 
 
This table presents regression results of tests the moderating effect of firm complexity on the association between location and 
earnings management. Panel A measure firm complexity with R&D intensity.  IND_RD equals to one if the average R&D 
expenditure in the industry (two-digit SIC code) -year is above the sample median and zero otherwise. Panel B measure firm 
complexity with a variable constructed from factor analysis using size, leverage and age (Coles et al., 2008).  We use sample 
median as the cutoff point to create indicator variable Complex. All models control industry and year effects, where industry is 
defined per Fama and French (1997) 49 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Referred to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Industry research and development intensity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RMAGGREGATE RMPROD RMDISX DA 
URBAN 0.0065 0.0023 0.0051 0.0059** 
 (1.07) (0.63) (1.54) (2.39) 
IND_RD 0.0235** 0.0168*** 0.0064 -0.0033 
 (2.26) (2.86) (1.00) (-0.80) 
URBAN *IND_RD -0.0299*** -0.0166*** -0.0145*** -0.0024 
 (-3.73) (-3.62) (-3.06) (-0.78) 
Delta 0.0072*** 0.0023** 0.0051*** 0.0001 
 (3.63) (2.01) (4.13) (0.16) 
Vega -0.0033** 0.0008 -0.0042*** -0.0014*** 
 (-2.22) (0.96) (-4.64) (-2.74) 
Tdc1 -0.0037 -0.0050*** 0.0015 -0.0030** 
 (-1.14) (-2.77) (0.75) (-2.54) 
CEO_tenure -0.0007 0.0013 -0.0019 0.0027*** 
 (-0.29) (0.99) (-1.34) (2.87) 
Per_female_dir 0.0411* 0.0172 0.0135 -0.0114 
 (1.73) (1.29) (0.93) (-1.33) 
Pind -0.0043 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0024 
 (-0.29) (-0.07) (-0.17) (-0.43) 
Analyst 0.0186*** 0.0040* 0.0148*** -0.0055*** 
 (4.25) (1.66) (5.52) (-3.41) 
Beat -0.0058*** -0.0039*** -0.0019** -0.0030*** 
 (-3.74) (-4.57) (-1.98) (-5.14) 
Big 4 -0.0058 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0012 
 (-0.83) (-0.59) (-0.76) (-0.45) 
Auditor_tenure -0.0019 0.0013 -0.0031* -0.0001 
 (-0.63) (0.80) (-1.65) (-0.13) 
NOA -0.0247*** -0.0031 -0.0202*** 0.0023 
 (-5.76) (-1.37) (-7.88) (1.41) 
Size 0.0073** 0.0045*** 0.0030* 0.0029*** 
 (2.41) (2.72) (1.65) (2.63) 
Tobin's Q 0.0156*** -0.0040 0.0179*** -0.0121*** 
 (2.69) (-1.29) (5.19) (-5.50) 
ROA -0.1588*** -0.1818*** 0.0129 0.1692*** 
 (-4.93) (-10.12) (0.65) (13.48) 
Leverage -0.0674*** -0.0298*** -0.0412*** 0.0080 
 (-4.82) (-3.85) (-4.85) (1.55) 
Firm_age 0.0073** 0.0021 0.0054*** 0.0003 
 (2.40) (1.23) (2.92) (0.23) 
Intangibles 0.0515*** 0.0057 0.0467*** -0.0294*** 
 (7.14) (1.36) (10.58) (-9.75) 
Litigation -0.0004 -0.0039 0.0008 -0.0013 
 (-0.05) (-0.84) (0.15) (-0.44) 
Constant -0.0089 0.0295** -0.0429*** 0.0262*** 
 (-0.34) (2.06) (-2.69) (2.84) 
Industry and year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 
R2 0.1063 0.1149 0.1344 0.1030 
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Panel B: Firm complexity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RMAGGREGATE RMPROD RMDISX DA 
URBAN 0.0077 0.0027 0.0045 0.0038* 
 (1.29) (0.84) (1.23) (1.68) 
Complex 0.0147*** 0.0085*** 0.0058* 0.0024 
 (2.65) (2.79) (1.70) (1.16) 
URBAN *Complex -0.0373*** -0.0206*** -0.0156*** 0.0014 
 (-4.74) (-4.63) (-3.23) (0.46) 
Delta 0.0095*** 0.0036*** 0.0061*** 0.0008 
 (4.96) (3.32) (5.22) (1.03) 
Vega -0.0032** 0.0008 -0.0041*** -0.0014*** 
 (-2.12) (1.02) (-4.55) (-2.72) 
Tdc1 -0.0008 -0.0033** 0.0028 -0.0020* 
 (-0.26) (-1.98) (1.50) (-1.83) 
CEO_tenure -0.0022 0.0004 -0.0026* 0.0023** 
 (-0.97) (0.30) (-1.83) (2.55) 
Per_female_dir 0.0539** 0.0242* 0.0195 -0.0082 
 (2.28) (1.83) (1.35) (-0.95) 
Pind -0.0003 0.0017 0.0002 -0.0017 
 (-0.02) (0.21) (0.03) (-0.30) 
Analyst 0.0237*** 0.0073*** 0.0166*** -0.0034** 
 (6.36) (3.59) (7.16) (-2.45) 
Beat -0.0058*** -0.0040*** -0.0019** -0.0030*** 
 (-3.78) (-4.60) (-2.00) (-5.18) 
Big 4 -0.0052 -0.0018 -0.0033 -0.0006 
 (-0.76) (-0.46) (-0.77) (-0.24) 
Auditor_tenure 0.0019 0.0029* -0.0007 0.0002 
 (0.66) (1.79) (-0.36) (0.15) 
NOA -0.0256*** -0.0034 -0.0209*** 0.0025 
 (-6.07) (-1.55) (-8.20) (1.59) 
Tobin's Q 0.0160*** -0.0042 0.0185*** -0.0133*** 
 (2.88) (-1.40) (5.55) (-6.24) 
ROA -0.1391*** -0.1729*** 0.0243 0.1701*** 
 (-4.36) (-9.68) (1.23) (13.55) 
Intangibles 0.0518*** 0.0066 0.0460*** -0.0302*** 
 (7.19) (1.59) (10.54) (-10.17) 
Litigation 0.0008 -0.0034 0.0017 -0.0020 
 (0.09) (-0.75) (0.30) (-0.66) 
Constant -0.0192 0.0232 -0.0465*** 0.0319*** 
 (-0.72) (1.58) (-2.82) (3.33) 
Industry and year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 
R2 0.1034 0.1131 0.1311 0.1018 
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Table 5 
Location and earnings management conditional on SOX 
 
This table presents regression results of tests the moderating effect of SOX on the association between location and earnings 
management. SOX is an indicator variable equals to one for fiscal year larger or equal to 2003 and zero otherwise.  All models 
control industry and year effects, where industry is defined per Fama and French (1997) 49 industry classifications. 
Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Referred to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions.  ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RMAGGREGATE RMPROD RMDISX DA 
URBAN 0.0101 0.0024 0.0069 0.0047* 
 (1.39) (0.60) (1.54) (1.70) 
SOX 0.0232* 0.0008 0.0211*** 0.0056 
 (1.87) (0.12) (2.74) (1.27) 
URBAN *SOX -0.0324*** -0.0153*** -0.0157*** -0.0004 
 (-3.88) (-3.28) (-3.04) (-0.14) 
Delta 0.0079*** 0.0026** 0.0054*** 0.0001 
 (3.98) (2.34) (4.38) (0.17) 
Vega -0.0032** 0.0008 -0.0042*** -0.0014*** 
 (-2.18) (1.01) (-4.62) (-2.72) 
Tdc1 -0.0040 -0.0051*** 0.0013 -0.0031*** 
 (-1.22) (-2.82) (0.66) (-2.60) 
CEO_tenure -0.0011 0.0011 -0.0021 0.0027*** 
 (-0.48) (0.82) (-1.47) (2.89) 
Per_female_dir 0.0419* 0.0179 0.0136 -0.0116 
 (1.77) (1.35) (0.94) (-1.35) 
Pind -0.0016 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0025 
 (-0.11) (0.14) (-0.05) (-0.44) 
Analyst 0.0184*** 0.0039 0.0147*** -0.0055*** 
 (4.20) (1.62) (5.49) (-3.38) 
Beat -0.0058*** -0.0039*** -0.0019** -0.0030*** 
 (-3.75) (-4.59) (-1.99) (-5.13) 
Big 4 -0.0044 -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0011 
 (-0.63) (-0.43) (-0.58) (-0.41) 
Auditor_tenure -0.0019 0.0013 -0.0031 -0.0001 
 (-0.64) (0.80) (-1.64) (-0.12) 
NOA -0.0249*** -0.0032 -0.0203*** 0.0023 
 (-5.85) (-1.45) (-7.94) (1.44) 
Size 0.0069** 0.0042** 0.0028 0.0029*** 
 (2.28) (2.57) (1.56) (2.62) 
Tobin's Q 0.0160*** -0.0037 0.0180*** -0.0122*** 
 (2.78) (-1.21) (5.24) (-5.52) 
ROA -0.1586*** -0.1818*** 0.0132 0.1694*** 
 (-4.94) (-10.16) (0.66) (13.48) 
Leverage -0.0691*** -0.0308*** -0.0419*** 0.0079 
 (-4.93) (-3.97) (-4.93) (1.54) 
Firm_age 0.0069** 0.0019 0.0052*** 0.0002 
 (2.26) (1.13) (2.80) (0.20) 
Intangibles 0.0527*** 0.0068 0.0467*** -0.0299*** 
 (7.35) (1.64) (10.71) (-10.04) 
Litigation 0.0016 -0.0028 0.0017 -0.0013 
 (0.18) (-0.61) (0.30) (-0.43) 
Constant -0.0227 0.0332** -0.0591*** 0.0215** 
 (-0.96) (2.53) (-4.05) (2.57) 
Industry and year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 
R2  0.1064 0.1145 0.1345 0.1028 
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Table 6 
Location and the choice between REM and AEM 
 
This table presents the results of using heckman selection model to investigate managerial choice between real earnings 
management and accrual earning management for earnings management suspect firms.  Firms are suspects when they have earnings 
just beat/ meet the prior year’s earnings, zero earnings, and analysts consensus forecast.  Panel A and B present the results of the 
first and second stage of Heckman selection model, respectively.  In the first stage, we estimate the likelihood of being earnings 
management suspects using all sample firms.  In the second stage, we analyze the association between location and earnings 
management using suspect firms only. All models control industry and year effects, where industry is defined per Fama and French 
(1997) 49 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Referred to Appendix A for 
detailed variable descriptions.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Panel A. Heckman selection model first stage 
  (1) 
 Suspect 
Beat -0.1408*** 
 (-6.75) 
Bonus 0.0292 
 (0.12) 
Option 0.0521*** 
 (2.94) 
Analyst 0.2622*** 
 (4.65) 
Shares 0.0531* 
 (1.75) 
ROA 2.2393*** 
 (6.61) 
Leverage -0.6022*** 
 (-3.58) 
L1.Tobin's Q 0.0403** 
 (2.05) 
Constant -2.6213*** 
 (-17.13) 
Year effect YES 
N 9938 
R2 0.0403 
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Panel B. Heckman selection model second stage 
  (1) 
 RMAGGREGATE 
URBAN -0.0243** 
 (-2.39)    
Delta 0.0140***    
 (2.73)    
Vega -0.0119***    
 (-2.90)    
Tdc1 -0.0090    
 (-1.20)    
CEO_tenure -0.0037    
 (-0.66)    
Per_female_dir -0.0220    
 (-0.38)    
Pind 0.0418    
 (1.25)    
Big 4 0.0123    
 (0.78)    
Auditor_tenure -0.0081    
 (-1.16)    
NOA -0.0177**    
 (-1.99)    
Size 0.0164***    
 (2.82)    
Tobin's Q 0.0000    
 (0.00)    
Firm_age 0.0085    
 (1.18)    
Intangibles 0.0865***    
 (5.53)    
Litigation 0.0379***    
 (3.14)    
Inverse_Mills -0.0444*    
 (-1.92)    
Constant -0.1052    
 (-1.15)    
Year effect YES    
N 1831    
r2 0.0839 
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Table 7 
Location and earnings management _Alternative measure for urban location 
 
This table presents regression results of tests on location effect on earnings management using alternative definitions for urban firms.  We define Metro1 and Metro 2 using the 
distance to major airports and the number of top 100 cities within 100-mile radiance and employ the sample median as cutoff points. All models control industry and year effects, 
where industry is defined per Fama and French (1997) 49 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Referred to Appendix A for 
detailed variable descriptions.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 RMAGGREGATE RMPROD RMDISX DA RMAGGREGATE RMPROD RMDISX DA          
Urban1 -0.0085** -0.0053** -0.0024 0.0027*     
 (-2.15) (-2.41) (-0.98) (1.86)     
Urban2     -0.0109** -0.0091*** -0.0027 0.0063*** 
     (-2.44) (-3.77) (-0.98) (3.92) 
Delta 0.0076*** 0.0025** 0.0052*** 0.0001 0.0077*** 0.0026** 0.0053*** 0.0000 
 (3.84) (2.24) (4.27) (0.13) (3.91) (2.34) (4.29) (0.03) 
Vega -0.0029* 0.0010 -0.0041*** -0.0015*** -0.0030** 0.0009 -0.0041*** -0.0014*** 
 (-1.95) (1.25) (-4.48) (-2.86) (-2.05) (1.12) (-4.53) (-2.74) 
Tdc1 -0.0043 -0.0053*** 0.0012 -0.0030** -0.0042 -0.0052*** 0.0012 -0.0031** 
 (-1.32) (-2.95) (0.61) (-2.48) (-1.29) (-2.89) (0.62) (-2.57) 
CEO_tenure -0.0009 0.0011 -0.0020 0.0028*** -0.0008 0.0012 -0.0020 0.0027*** 
 (-0.40) (0.86) (-1.39) (2.98) (-0.35) (0.93) (-1.37) (2.92) 
Per_female_dir 0.0433* 0.0187 0.0143 -0.0118 0.0470** 0.0217 0.0152 -0.0138 
 (1.82) (1.40) (0.98) (-1.37) (1.97) (1.63) (1.04) (-1.61) 
Pind 0.0001 0.0022 0.0000 -0.0030 -0.0026 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0018 
 (0.01) (0.27) (0.00) (-0.54) (-0.17) (0.03) (-0.08) (-0.32) 
Analyst 0.0193*** 0.0043* 0.0151*** -0.0056*** 0.0188*** 0.0039 0.0149*** -0.0053*** 
 (4.40) (1.81) (5.63) (-3.43) (4.28) (1.63) (5.58) (-3.25) 
Beat -0.0057*** -0.0039*** -0.0019* -0.0030*** -0.0057*** -0.0039*** -0.0019* -0.0030*** 
 (-3.68) (-4.51) (-1.94) (-5.17) (-3.68) (-4.51) (-1.95) (-5.18) 
Big 4 -0.0045 -0.0014 -0.0027 -0.0016 -0.0046 -0.0016 -0.0027 -0.0014 
 (-0.65) (-0.38) (-0.64) (-0.60) (-0.66) (-0.42) (-0.64) (-0.54) 
Auditor_tenure -0.0017 0.0015 -0.0030 -0.0002 -0.0014 0.0016 -0.0029 -0.0003 
 (-0.57) (0.88) (-1.60) (-0.18) (-0.47) (0.98) (-1.55) (-0.24) 
NOA -0.0248*** -0.0032 -0.0203*** 0.0023 -0.0248*** -0.0032 -0.0203*** 0.0023 
 (-5.81) (-1.42) (-7.92) (1.42) (-5.80) (-1.42) (-7.91) (1.43) 
Size 0.0067** 0.0041** 0.0028 0.0029*** 0.0067** 0.0041** 0.0028 0.0029*** 
 (2.22) (2.51) (1.52) (2.68) (2.23) (2.53) (1.52) (2.64) 
Tobin's Q 0.0161*** -0.0037 0.0180*** -0.0122*** 0.0160*** -0.0038 0.0180*** -0.0122*** 
 (2.78) (-1.20) (5.23) (-5.54) (2.76) (-1.21) (5.22) (-5.52) 
ROA -0.1586*** -0.1818*** 0.0133 0.1694*** -0.1583*** -0.1820*** 0.0135 0.1698*** 
 (-4.91) (-10.10) (0.67) (13.46) (-4.90) (-10.14) (0.68) (13.51) 
Leverage -0.0687*** -0.0305*** -0.0417*** 0.0077 -0.0680*** -0.0301*** -0.0415*** 0.0075 
 (-4.91) (-3.94) (-4.92) (1.50) (-4.87) (-3.89) (-4.90) (1.46) 
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Firm_age 0.0075** 0.0023 0.0054*** 0.0002 0.0076** 0.0023 0.0054*** 0.0001 
 (2.47) (1.32) (2.94) (0.15) (2.48) (1.37) (2.95) (0.08) 
Intangibles 0.0524*** 0.0065 0.0466*** -0.0297*** 0.0515*** 0.0061 0.0463*** -0.0296*** 
 (7.33) (1.58) (10.71) (-9.98) (7.26) (1.48) (10.71) (-9.95) 
Litigation 0.0020 -0.0024 0.0017 -0.0017 0.0009 -0.0034 0.0015 -0.0010 
 (0.23) (-0.52) (0.31) (-0.57) (0.10) (-0.74) (0.26) (-0.33) 
Constant -0.1658*** -0.0292 -0.1450*** 0.0198 -0.1649*** -0.0276 -0.1449*** 0.0182 
 (-4.41) (-1.35) (-5.77) (0.95) (-4.38) (-1.24) (-5.78) (0.85) 
Industry and year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 10,660 
r2 0.1047 0.1130 0.1336 0.1024 0.1049 0.1137 0.1336 0.1034 
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Table 8 
Location and earnings management - Simultaneous equations 
This table presents regression results of tests on location effect on earnings management using simultaneous equations allowing 
real earnings management and accrual earnings management to be determined simultaneously.  All models control industry and 
year effects, where industry is defined per Fama and French (1997) 49 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  Referred to Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 RMAGGREGATE DA 
URBAN -0.0122*** 0.0087** 
 (-3.01) (2.38) 
Delta 0.0056  
 (0.53)  
Vega 0.0002 0.0033 
 (0.00) (0.23) 
Tdc1  -0.0565 
  (-1.47) 
CEO_tenure  0.0017 
  (0.81) 
Per_female_dir 0.0376  
 (0.67)  
Pind -0.0090 0.0250 
 (-0.14) (1.55) 
Analyst 0.0179 -0.0041 
 (1.22) (-1.38) 
Beat -0.0060*** 0.0008 
 (-3.96) (0.28) 
Big 4 -0.0064 0.0022 
 (-0.76) (0.68) 
Auditor_tenure -0.0020 -0.0005 
 (-0.67) (-0.39) 
NOA -0.0245*** 0.0020 
 (-5.18) (1.63) 
Size 0.0048 0.0235** 
 (0.29) (2.01) 
Tobin's Q 0.0158*** -0.0068** 
 (3.31) (-1.97) 
ROA -0.1591*** 0.1688*** 
 (-4.58) (12.90) 
Leverage -0.0699***  
 (-5.36)  
Firm_age 0.0069  
 (1.30)  
Intangibles 0.0511*** -0.0203*** 
 (3.48) (-3.23) 
Litigation  -0.0000 
  (-0.00) 
Constant -0.0096 0.2603 
 (-0.07) (1.37) 
Industry and year effects Yes Yes 
N 10,660 10,660 
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Appendix A. 
Variables Definitions 
Location variables  
URBAN An indicator variable equals one if a company headquarter is in the metropolitan statistical area of New 
York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco, Boston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Philadelphia, 
Houston, or Miami, and zero otherwise  
 
 
Urban 1 An indicator variable equals one if the minimum distance between a company’s headquarter and a major 
airport is below the sample median, and zero otherwise, where major airports are the large and medium-
sized commercial service airport hubs that account for at least 0.25% of total passenger boarding.  
Urban 2 An indicator variable equals one if the number of top-100 cities (based on 2010 Census) within 100 miles 
radiance from a company’s headquarter is above the sample median, and zero otherwise   
Earnings management variables 
RMAGGREGATE Sum of abnormal production costs and the negative value of abnormal discretionary expenses 
RMPROD 
The deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression (Abnormal 
production costs):  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘4
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
 
 
where PROD is production costs, defined as the sum of costs of goods sold and change in inventory during 
the year, 
RMDISX The deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression (Abnormal 
discretionary expenses):  
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
DA Discretionary accruals calculated using the performance matched method following Kothari et al. (2016).  
Delta The natural logarithm of one plus the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 1% change in stock price 
Vega The natural logarithm of one plus the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01 change in standard 
deviation of stock returns  
Tdc1 The natural logarithm of one plus CEO total annual compensation  
CEO_tenure The natural logarithm of one plus the years CEO has been served as CEO 
Per_female_dir Total number of female directors scaled by total number of directors on board  
Pind 
The number of independent directors scaled by the total number of directors on board, where the 
independent directors are the directors who are not employees of the firm or related to the firms through 
business relations. 
Analyst The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm 
Beat The number of times the actual earnings per share is larger than the mean analysts forecast  
Big 4 An indicator variable with a value of one if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 8, and zero otherwise 
Auditor_tenure The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the auditor has audited the firm 
NOA 
Shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities plus total debt, scaled by total assets for the 
previous year  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets  
Tobin's Q Total market value of assets scaled by book value of assets  
ROA The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation to total assets  
Leverage The sum of current and long-term debt scaled by total assets  
Firm_age The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the firm appears on CRSP  
Intangibles Research and development and advertising expense scaled by sales  
Litigation 
An indicator variable with a value of one if a firm’s SIC code is 2833–2836, 8731–8734, 7371–7379, 3570–
3577, 3600–3674, and zero otherwise  
Bonus CEO annual bonus compensation scaled by annual total compensation  
Option 
The value of CEO option portfolio estimated from Black-Scholes model scaled by annual total 
compensation  
Shares The natural logarithm of firm’s shares outstanding  
   
 
